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ALVIN BACA*

FERC & ERA: Issues in Natural Gas
Regulation
INTRODUCTION
The natural gas industry, as all of us know, has for the last three years
been involved in revolutionary change and restructuring. As producers,
we have watched from the side-lines as producer-pipeline-marketing relationships have been transformed, as contracts we have banked on have
been torn to shreds, and as our traditional markets evaporate in the face
of competition from foreign sources of gas or from fuel oil. Producers
have been given various reasons for the radical changes, the most common
of which is that with the deregulation of natural gas, the market itself is
the cause of this fundamental change. What we call the market is not

alone responsible. Two federal agencies-the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission [FERC] and the Economic Regulatory Administration [ERA]--

are jointly responsible for much of the ongoing radical restructuring and
distress in the natural gas industry.
ECONOMIC REGULATORY ADMINISTRATION

Responsibility and Jurisdiction
The ERA' is the federal agency whose responsibility is to authorize
imports of natural gas under Section 3 of the Natural Gas Act.2 The ERA
also develops import policy and a trade framework for imported natural

gas. The ERA is an agency of the U.S. Department of Energy [DOE],
from which it takes much of its direction.
Import Criteria
The published volicy objectives and criteria used by the ERA for approving imports are: (1) competitive import arrangements are in the public
*Development of this chapter was the result of a joint effort by the author, Bob Platt and George
Yates.
1. Created by the 1977 DOE Organization Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7136 (1982).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 717(b) (1982). Prior to enactment of the DOE Organization Act, all Section 3
authority vested in the Federal Power Commission. From 1978 to 1984, Section 3 was authority
shared by the FERC and ERA. See Huard, Regulation of the Importation and Exportation ofNatural
Gas: A Survey and Analysisof Section 3 of the Natural Gas Act, 15 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 533 (1981).
On Feb. 22, 1984, the Secretary of Energy rescinded all of the FERC's Section 3 authority. 49 Fed.
Reg. 6684 (1984).
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interest; (2) market-responsive, freely negotiated contracts lead to competitive arrangements; and (3) U.S. and imported gas should have equal
access to U.S. markets.'
Under the direction of Secretary of Energy Hodel and continued under
Secretary Herrington, the de facto policy of the ERA has been to introduce
large volumes of imported gas to displace markets previously served by
domestic gas, to reduce the burner tip price of natural gas, and, correspondingly, the domestic wellhead price.
Recent Rulings
In the last four years the ERA has approved import applications which,
if added to previous licenses, would result in the approval of a sufficient
volume of imported gas to displace fifteen percent of the domestic market. 4
The wholesale approval of import licenses began in February 1984
when Secretary Hodel, overcoming what he called "non-competitive
forces," negotiated with the Canadian government to end government
regulation of border prices. This drastically reduced the price of imported
gas from Canada.5 About the same time, PG&E, the large California local
distribution company (and majority owner of the Canadian distribution
system, Pacific Gas Transmission [PGT], which supplies PG&E,6 and
also the owner of a large Canadian supplier of gas to PGT, Alberta &
Southern) persuaded the Canadians that they were losing market share in
the United States. As a result, the Canadian government devised their
two-part rate reform system which, while preserving high prices for the
bulk of imported gas, effectively undercut El Paso's delivered supplies
by selling incremental volumes at substantially discounted prices.
I don't wish to leave the impression that I oppose imports or arm'slength competition with non-domestic suppliers. I do not. I am against
the federal government's granting, through an administrative agency,
advantages to foreign suppliers which domestic producers do not enjoy.
In issuing several large import licenses, the ERA did just that. PG&E
has license to import Canadian gas through their Canadian subsidiary,
Pacific Gas Transmission, under long-term contract from their wholly
3. New Policy Guidelines and Delegations Orders from Secretary of Energy, 49 Fed. Reg. 6684
(1984). The PPROA contends that these "guidelines" were promulgated in violation of § 404 of the
DOE Organization Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7174, because they were not referred to the FERC for review.
The D.C. Circuit has this matter pending before it. PPRO v. ERA, No. 86-1058 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
4. As of May 1987, the volume of "blanket" ERA import authorizations exceed 14.8 tcf of gas.
Domestic annual production is approximately 16 tcf per year.
5. In many cases, the change in policy did not drastically reduce the cost per unit of imported
natural gas. The Canadians restructured their rates into a two-part rate form. For example, if you
rent a car for $20 per day and 5 cents per mile, is it less expensive than a car renting for $50 per
day and I cent per mile? The answer depends on how many miles you drive.
6. PG&E is the California distributor. PGT is the pipeline.
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owned Canadian production company, Alberta & Southern, on a preferred
basis. The preference is the result not only of the ERA's license process,
but FERC Order 3807 which granted rate-treatment preferences to Canadian subsidiaries of the California LDC's over domestic pipelines. I
will cover Order 380 in more detail later in this article.
What are the cumulative results of the ERA's import policy? Canadian
imports compete not only with short-term spot market sales but with
system supply gas. Ironically, much domestic system supply gas has been
forced into the spot market through pipeline contract abrogation' or through
pipeline exercise of contract market-out clauses. The low priced gas is
primarily American.
FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION
HistoricalPerspective
The FERC is the successor body to the Federal Power Commission
(FPC) and is charged with rather broad regulatory authorities under the
Natural Gas Act of 1938' (as interpreted by the courts) and the Natural
Gas Policy Act of 19781° for the regulation of the transportation and sale
of natural gas. In addition, the FERC regulates the resale rates and facilities for imported gas."
The FERC is made up of politically appointed Commissioners, and is
thus subject to changes in political perspectives on natural gas. The FPC
was dominated by consumerists (in the narrow sense) and price controllers
until the natural gas shortages of the mid-seventies. During the Reagan
administration, rather than involving itself in setting "just and reasonable"
rates 2 for natural gas, the FERC has been actively reshaping the structure
of the natural gas industry.
Ratemaking Basics
A primary responsibility of the FERC has been setting the rates that
interstate pipelines can charge their customers for jurisdictional sales.
Gas sold to an interstate pipeline by a producer or an affiliate and resold
to a regulated local distribution company [LDC] is a jurisdictional sale
7. Elimination of Variable Costs from Certain Natural Gas Pipeline Minimum Commodity Bill
Provisions, 49 Fed. Reg. 22778 (1984). Wisconsin Gas Co. v. FERC, No. 84-1358 (D.C. Cir. Aug.
20, 1985) followed the pipeline commodity provisions.
8. See, e.g., Tennessee Gas Pipeline Company v. Pan-Canadian Petroleum Co., 37 FERC 61,236
(1986), rehearing denied, 38 FERC 61,236 (1987).
9. 15 U.S.C. §§717-717(w) (1982).
10. 15 U.S.C. §§3301-3342 (1982).
11. 15 U.S.C. §§4, 5, 7, 717(c), (d), and (f). See generally, Wisconsin Gas.
12. 15 U.S.C. § 717(c).
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ahd prices are controlled by the FERC."3 This kind of gas sale was the
traditional market for gas producers until the spot sale programs began
recently. Comments about ratemaking concern this typ&of sale. The sale
of gas to an end user that is not a regulated LDC is not a jurisdictional
sale but is still certificated.' 4 Transportation of gas not purchased for
resale should be considered separately from the normal rate setting process.
For regulatory purposes, pipeline costs are classified into fixed and
variable costs known as "demand" and "commodity" charges. If you
rent a car, it is common to pay a per-day rate, say $50. This is a demand
charge which gives you the right to use the car during the rental period.
You also might pay a mileage rate, say $.10 a mile. This would be your
commodity rate. By altering the fixed and variable rates,' 5 car rental
companies can enhance or detract from the marketability of their automobiles. The FERC does somewhat the same thing by altering the fixed
costs includable in commodity charges. In this way the FERC attempts
to satisfy low or high volume customers. To avoid complicating this
discussion further, I will now leave commodity and demand charges. This
concept is very important in understanding how the FERC has changed
our gas market and will be discussed later.
To understand the market and its participants, we share the premise
that during a period of supply abundance, there is a finite charge that
consumers will pay for natural gas. That market price per mcf has to be
divided among producers, pipelines, and LDCs. The price that producers
have been receiving during this period of market contraction has been,
with FERC's approval, whatever is left over after the interstate pipelines
and LDCs have taken their fees off the top.
There are three important generalizations which help us understand
interstate pipelines (and they are almost always true): (1) they pay no
taxes (they are guaranteed an after-tax rate of return); 6 (2) they litigate
free, even when suing customers (this is a great device to be used in
conjunction with breaking contracts because pipelines can wear down
their opponents through the litigation process, and their customers pay
for it all); (3) pipelines are never at risk in a regulated transaction. They
13. Any "sale for resale in interstate commerce" is subject to the FERC's Natural Gas Act
jurisdiction, except for certain "first sales" removed by operation of Section 601 (a)(1) of the NGPA.

14. The transportation is either certified under § 7(c) of the Natural Gas Act, or authorized under
§31 (a) of the NGPA See, FPC v. Transcontinental Gas, 365 U.S. I (1961).
15. Pipeline rates are set based upon recovering a statutory tax rate, regardless of the actual tax
rate paid by the corporation. To earn its after tax allowed return, it must meet its "billing determinate"
sales and transportation levels. By setting such targets too low and tax rates too high, pipelines
virtually allow earn returns far in excess of the return figures used to construct their rates.
16. Associated Gas Distributors v. FERC, No. 85-1811 (D.C. Cir. June 23, 1987).
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are theoretically at risk, but the regulatory system has, in fact, always
bailed them out.
Put simply, profit to a pipeline is calculated as a rate of return of
invested capital (referred to as a "rate base"), meaning that the more
that a pipeline invests, the larger the return. A regulated pipeline, therefore, has little incentive to moderate capital costs as do other businesses.
A device commonly used by the interstate pipelines is to coerce its
customers into higher rates under the FERC process. When a pipeline
applies for a rate increase, it is effective for five months before it can be
challenged. This often results in settlement at rates higher than would
normally be approved.
An interstate pipeline, in addition to its approved return, has two
additional significant sources of income: (1) underestimating throughput
and (2) overstating costs. During a rate hearing here is an overwhelming
temptation to underestimate the volume of gas to be sold by that pipeline
before the next rate hearing. Since a pipeline rate includes reimbursement
for fixed costs on an mcf basis, the lower the estimated volume, the
higher the transportation rate per unit sold. Should a pipeline underestimate the volume sold, an accident which predictably happens, the Commission does not correspondingly reduce the transportation rate approved
for the next period. Under current FERC rules such retroactivity is prohibited.
The result of our ratemaking system? The interstate pipelines, during
a period of acute economic distress to producers, have been able to achieve
higher returns while selling smaller volumes. For example, pipeline margins from 1981 to 1984 increased from an average of $1.17 to $1.64 per
thousand cubic feet [mcf]. Most businesses make more by selling more,
and while this may be the case for the pipelines someday, it is not yet.
While some end users and most producer prices are subject to competitive
market forces, pipeline costs during this period inflated to fill the vacuum
created by wellhead prices controlled either by government or constrained
by pipeline activities. The percent return approved by the FERC is an
after-tax percentage which, for the last several years has averaged around
fifteen percent. Based on a recent estimate by the AGA, this figure declined to about 12.5 percent in 1985. These returns, of course, imply a
pre-tax return of twenty percent or more, risk free.
Something is obviously wrong with a regulatory system that allows
utilities guaranteed returns of this magnitude while the nonregulated segment of the same industry bleeds to death.
Order 380: Beginning of a Painful Transition
In the summer of 1980 the FERC turned the somewhat level playing
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field on its end, with producers, El Paso Natural Gas and Transwestern
at the bottom, and with Southern California Gas and PG&E at the top.
Recall the above discussion of demand and commodity rates. The
FERC, in Order 380, denied interstate pipelines the right to include
variable costs in any negotiated minimum bill obligations (the pipeline
equivalent of take-or-pay) thereby relieving SOCAL and PG&E of a
substantial penalty for not taking gas from El Paso and Transwestern.
When LDC's have no minimum bill, they can swing from contracted
(system supply) gas to other sources of gas supply. The gas that PG&E
and SOCAL chose to swing to was Canadian gas-through their subsidiaries-and spot market gas.
You might reasonably ask why PG&E and SOCAL were allowed to
substitute Canadian gas (their own gas in some cases-remember Alberta
& Southern) for domestic contracted gas. The answer is that the Canadian
distribution companies owned by PG&E & SOCAL were granted exemption from Order 380 so that they can pass minimum bill obligations,
onto Calfornia LDC's. Under the California Public Utilities Commission's
(CPUC) "Least Cost Rule," average costs of Canadian gas, including
demand charges, are not compared to average costs of domestic supplies;
only variable costs are considered. The Canadian gas is allowed the
exclusive privilege to carry a demand charge which not only causes that
gas to be overpriced compared to domestic supplies, but the existence of
the demand charge is a guarantee that Canadian gas will flow while
domestic gas is shut-in.
Of interest to any student of FERC is the method by which Pacific Gas
Transmission, subsidiary of PG&E, and Pacific Interstate Transmission
(PIT), a subsidiary of SOCAL, were exempted from Order 380. The
FERC preferred an oblique rather than a direct exemption for the California LDC's. The Commission, therefore, exempted any LDC involved
in the unsuccessful Alaska Natural Gas transmission system. Conveniently, both subsidiaries were involved. We were playing against a stacked
deck.
The blatant conflict of interest shared by the California LDCs has been
used to manipulate the California market. The temptations have been
overwhelming. A Mae West quote describes their behavior: "I generally
avoid temptation unless I can't resist it."
Based on the propensity of interstate pipelines to disregard contracts
with producers, Order 380 could be regarded as poetic justice, except
that it became an excuse for more contract abrogation. Order 380and
the later elimination of the commodity minimum bills were the father of
the current spot market. Without variable costs in the minimum bill there
was no incentive to continue existing contractual, supply relationships.
In addition, sellers were pressured by pipelines to convert contracted gas
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to spot market gas. The spot market exploded. What was meant to be a
measure to enhance market discipline was, in fact, direct and unwarranted
intrusion by a regulatory body into commercial contractual agreements.
Rather than market discipline, chaos resulted, with, once again, the producer losing. This ushered in the present environment of gas-on-gas as
well as gas-on-fuel oil competition as market discipline evaporated.
Order 451: End of Price Vintaging
FERC Order 451 was the result of a recommendation by the DOE that
the FERC establish a ceiling price for all price-controlled gas which would
be high enough, in effect, to eliminate price vintaging. Order 451 established a ceiling price of $2.57 per mmbtu which is, as we know, above
the current market price for new natural gas. As the critics of 451 have
maintained, this would effectively end federal price controls on natural
gas. It would indeed, except for the details. Collection of a higher price
under this Order is dependent upon a very complicated process called a
"good faith negotiation procedure" where producer contracts, other than
the one the producer might wish to improve, are opened up for negotiation.
This procedure carries severe risks for the unwary producer, and for that
reason, I don't think it will be used extensively.
Order 436: Nondiscriminatory Transportation
FERC Order 436 establishing "voluntary nondiscriminatory transportation" is an attempt by FERC to reform the interstate natural gas transportation system. Even though the Order did not immediately convert
interstate pipelines from merchants to transporters, it has dramatically
speeded up that process.
This order allows each interstate pipeline to voluntarily choose to transport natural gas for third-parties if a written request is received from a
shipper. If a pipeline chooses to be a voluntary transporter, that pipeline
must discontinue existing transportation arrangements, including gas
transported for affiliates. Based on this definition of "voluntarism" almost
all interstate pipelines have or will agree to be 436 carriers. The FERC,
however, has allowed the process to slide. Many applications of 436 are
waiting for FERC approval on a case-by-case basis which involves the
danger of special deals which may not benefit the producer.
A major condition to 436 transportation, one especially affecting independent producers, is "available pipeline capacity." Because several
months were allowed for each pipeline to choose 436 status, pipelines
had the opportunity to reserve noninterruptible pipeline capacity for their
existing customers [LDC's], pipeline affiliates, and major transporters.
Other potential gas transporters have, in cases, been allowed transportation only on an interruptible basis. Unfortunately-and surprisingly-
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the transportation rates for firm as well as interruptible sales seem to be
identical. Order 436, therefore, gives even more advantage to interstate
pipelines, LDC's, and pipeline affiliates. It may well be that the only
way independents can serve their traditional customers is through pipelines' marketing affiliates. If there is an advantage to the average independent, it will probably be evolutionary.
Canadian producers have commissioned the FERC for inclusion of
Canadian gas as a beneficiary under Order 436. 1 expect their request to
be granted.
Order 436 has been challenged in court by major interstate pipelines,
and that case is now being heard by the D.C. Circuit Court. 7 It is certainly
possible that portions of Order 436 will be overturned.
Ending Discriminatory "Affiliate" Practices
In late September of last year, the FERC announced efforts to end
discrimination by interstate pipelines in favor of production affiliates. In
the words of Commissioner Chuck Trabandt, FERC would address "a
practice in which pipelines had been engaging with relative caprice for
50 years." Complaints that pipelines have continued to honor contracts
with affiliates, including full take-or-pay, while refusing to honor contracts
of producers, have reached the ears of the FERC. This kind of discrimination is prohibited by the NGPA. Currently, Commissioner Trabandt
and Commissioner Mike Naeve are debating solutions. Trabandt suggests
a standard rate-test to determine if discrimination exists, while Naeve
wants the FERC to address the issue on a case-by-case basis.,
Meanwhile, in a very significant case, the FERC has agreed to consider
a complaint made by the Independent Petroleum Association of the Mountain States [IPAMS] against Panhandle Eastern and Colorado Interstate
Gas with transportation requests by both pipelines. IPAMS charges that
these pipelines transported gas in a discriminatory manner favoring pipeline affiliates to maintain monopoly positions. 8 The enthusiasm with
which FERC is approaching this newly discovered issue is very significant.
CONCLUSION
The federal government, through the FERC and ERA, has radically
transformed the domestic natural gas industry. That transformation continues. The industry that emerges after this transition will be only a distant
relative of the industry we knew and understood.
17. Initial decision found violations. Independent Petroleum Association of the Mountain States
v. Panhandle Eastern, 38 FERC 63,009 (1987).

